University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2009

Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial:
When Is a Lab Report Testimonial?
Joe Bourne

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bourne, Joe, "Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: When Is a Lab Report Testimonial?" (2009). Minnesota Law Review. 540.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/540

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Note
Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial:
When Is a Lab Report Testimonial?
Joe Bourne∗
Scientific evidence creates a unique opportunity for prosecutorial abuse.1 Investigations of police crime laboratories have
revealed widespread error and sloppiness—even corruption.2
Even well-intentioned, conscientious crime-laboratory workers
may be subject to “subconscious . . . pro-prosecution bias” and
“confirmation bias,” which can color their interpretations or reporting of results.3 The reports these forensic scientists generate play a powerful role in criminal prosecutions. According to
the “CSI effect” theory, juror determinations increasingly rely
on misunderstandings of the nature of scientific evidence
spawned by forensic science television shows such as CSI:
Crime Scene Investigation, which “portray[] forensic science as
high-tech magic.”4 At the same time, the use of scientific evidence at trials has increased significantly in recent years.5
∗ J.D. Candidate 2009, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 2005,
Emory University. I would like to thank Professor Stephen Cribari for assistance in formulating a topic and for feedback and encouragement along the
way. I also thank the board and staff of Volumes 92 and 93 of the Minnesota
Law Review, in particular Nick Smith, Jenni Vainik, Mike Schoepf, Liz Borer,
and Kyle Hawkins for their time, commentary, and support.
1. Cf. Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV.
475, 499 (2006) (describing the case of a West Virginia state trooper and forensic serologist who “engage[d] in long-term, systematic, and deliberate falsification of evidence in criminal cases”).
2. See generally id. at 491–500 (discussing sources of error).
3. Id. at 496–97.
4. N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The CSI Effect: Popular Fiction
About Forensic Science Affects the Public’s Expectations About Real Forensic
Science, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 357, 358 (2007). For a detailed treatment of the
CSI effect, see generally Tom R. Tyler, Viewing CSI and the Threshold of
Guilt: Managing Truth and Justice in Reality and Fiction, 115 YALE L.J. 1050
(2006) (discussing the evidence for and against a “CSI effect” and exploring
the potential implications of such an effect). Jurors, disappointed by evidence
failing to live up to the standards developed from shows like CSI, could be
more likely to find reasonable doubt. Id. at 1052. Or, they could be more likely
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Meanwhile, constitutional law pertaining to the use of this
science is in a state of turmoil. In 2004, the Supreme Court in
Crawford v. Washington6 dramatically reworked its Confrontation Clause7 analysis, holding that testimonial hearsay is inadmissible unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant
had a prior opportunity to cross-examine that witness.8 The
Court expressly did not define “testimonial” beyond setting a
minimum baseline;9 it also failed to explicitly delineate a clear
analytical framework.10 The Court again failed to set forth a
comprehensive definition of “testimonial” in Davis v. Washington.11 Thus, while the confrontation right would offer a defendant meaningful protection from an analyst’s scientific report if
that report is testimonial, the Court did not clearly set forth the
concept of testimoniality.12
Because both Crawford and Davis were decided in the context of statements made to police officers or agents of the police
by persons who had directly witnessed the crimes at issue,13
lower courts have had to fend for themselves in attempting to
figure out what to do with scientific evidence such as laboratory
reports and coroner’s reports. Under cases such as Ohio v. Roto find the defendant guilty due to the combination of an overbelief in the
probative value of science and the well-documented psychological desire to see
wrongdoers punished. See id. at 1063–76.
5. See John M. Spires, Note, Testimonial or Nontestimonial? The Admissibility of Forensic Evidence After Crawford v. Washington, 94 KY. L.J. 187,
187 (2005).
6. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
8. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
9. See id. (“[Testimonial] applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a
preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”).
10. See id. (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”).
11. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 813 (2006) (noting that the
Court was not “attempting to produce an exhaustive classification of all conceivable statements [that are] . . . testimonial”).
12. See id.; cf. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 192 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“There is no way to test the recollection and sift the conscience of
a witness regarding the facts of an alleged offense if he is unwilling or unable
to be questioned about them; defense counsel cannot probe the story of a silent
witness and attempt to expose facts that qualify or discredit it.”).
13. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38 (“At [the defendant’s] trial, the State played
for the jury [his wife’s] tape-recorded statement to the police . . . .”); Davis, 547
U.S. at 813 (“[A] 911 operator ascertained from [the victim] that she had been
assaulted by her former boyfriend . . . [and] the court admitted the 911 recording . . . .”).
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berts,14 which considered factors such as the reliability of the
evidence and articulated traditional constitutional balancing
tests, such evidence typically withstood Confrontation Clause
scrutiny.15 State courts and the lower federal courts are currently struggling to determine if, and explain why, they are
dealing with testimonial or nontestimonial evidence.16 Courts
are split on how to handle these cases, not due to distinguishable factual circumstances, but due to widely variant understandings of what the Supreme Court meant by “testimonial.”17
Part I of this Note explicates the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause doctrine and the shift from Roberts to Crawford
and Davis. Part II looks at the scientific-evidence question and
examines how the lower courts have addressed it. This Part also considers, and rejects, the developing case law holding that
scientific evidence, if the product of a machine-based process, is
not a statement of any person and therefore cannot constitute
testimonial hearsay. Part III offers an analysis for courts to follow. In order to be faithful to Crawford, courts should apply a
bright-line rule that covers the most common types of cases: lab
reports prepared by or for the police to further the investigation
or prosecution of a suspected crime are per se testimonial. Under the limited facts falling outside of such a rule—including
cases involving autopsy reports, which present somewhat different constitutional considerations—courts should undertake
fact-intensive, case-by-case inquiries, considering the criteria
laid out more fully in Part III.
I. SUPREME COURT CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides:
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against
him . . . .”18 Through the Fourteenth Amendment, the Confrontation Clause applies against the states.19 Yet what it guaran14. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
15. Id. at 66 (“[A] statement is admissible only if it bears adequate ‘indicia
of reliability.’”).
16. See Cyrus P.W. Rieck, Note, How to Deal with Laboratory Reports under Crawford v. Washington: A Question with No Good Answer, 62 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 839, 907 (2008) (explaining that courts are “desperate for an answer”).
17. See id. (noting that courts are reaching different conclusions on “essentially the same facts”).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
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tees in practice has been the subject of considerable debate, in
part, no doubt, because as the second Justice Harlan once
noted, the text on its face leaves itself open to widely variant
interpretations.20 Judicial understanding of the Confrontation
Clause has changed significantly through the years. This Note
first considers the long-dominant Roberts paradigm, followed
by the sudden shift to Crawford analysis and the Davis Court’s
addition to Crawford’s guidance.
A. ROBERTS RELIABILITY AND BALANCING
Following precedent, in 1980 the Roberts Court held that a
defendant’s confrontation right was not violated by the prosecution’s use of hearsay statements made by an unavailable
witness at a preliminary hearing at which the defendant functionally cross-examined the witness.21 Apart from this narrow
holding, the Court’s opinion was important for its reasoning,
which came to stand for two doctrinal propositions.
First, Roberts stood for the proposition that the Confrontation Clause was subject to a balancing test. Acknowledging in
dicta that the Clause “reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial,”22 the Court explained that “competing interests, if ‘closely examined,’ may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial.”23 While the language of close examination
suggests a difficult threshold for the government to pass, the
Court noted that the government always has “strong” competing interests in two overarching areas: “effective law enforcement” and “development and precise formulation of the rules of
evidence applicable in criminal proceedings.”24 This could be
read as a signal to lower courts that the defendant’s confrontation right is, on balance, really not all that weighty.
Second, the Court concluded that, for Confrontation Clause
purposes, admissibility of the hearsay testimony of an unavailable declarant depended on the reliability of that hearsay.25 As
20. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring
in the judgment) (“[T]he clause may be read to confer nothing more than a
right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial. . . .
[But] the clause is equally susceptible of being interpreted as a blanket prohibition on the use of any hearsay testimony.”).
21. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70–73 (1980).
22. Id. at 63.
23. Id. at 64 (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 66 (noting that hearsay of an unavailable witness may be
admitted “if it bears adequate ‘indicia of reliability’”).
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a per se matter, hearsay was deemed to exhibit sufficient “indicia of reliability” if it matched a “firmly rooted hearsay exception.”26 Otherwise the prosecution would have to show that the
hearsay bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” to
get it admitted at trial against the defendant without allowing
the defendant a right to confront the declarant.27 In other
words, the Roberts Court construed the Clause to procedurally
protect criminal defendants from substantively unreliable accusatory evidence.28
B. REJECTING ROBERTS-TYPE ANALYSIS: CRAWFORD’S
“TESTIMONIAL” FRAMEWORK
In 2004 the Supreme Court overruled the Roberts test in
Crawford v. Washington, finding reliability analysis “so unpredictable that it fails to provide meaningful protection from even
core confrontation violations.”29 The Court also rejected the use
of a balancing test where a defendant’s confrontation right was
violated.30 Crawford instead issued a bright-line command: testimonial hearsay is only admissible if the witness is unavailable and the accused had “a prior opportunity for crossexamination.”31 Since it was not necessary on the facts of the
case to do so, the Court opted not to “spell out a comprehensive
definition of ‘testimonial.’”32 Consequently, the considerations
that were important to the Crawford Court’s discussion of testimonial hearsay must be looked to for any future Confrontation Clause analysis.
The Court traced the common law origin of the confrontation right back to the famous 1603 treason trial of Sir Walter
Raleigh, in which Raleigh was sentenced to death based on the
out-of-court, co-conspiratorial confession of Lord Cobham.33 Raleigh argued that Cobham was lying, and demanded that Cob26. Id.
27. Id.
28. But cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004) (explaining
that the framers created a “procedural rather than substantive” constitutional
protection in order “to ensure reliability of evidence,” and criticizing the Roberts test for allowing juries to hear evidence untested by adversarial crossexamination where a judge found the evidence to be substantively reliable).
29. Id. at 63.
30. See id. at 67–68 (“By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees
with open-ended balancing tests, we do violence to their design.”).
31. Id. at 68.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 43–44.
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ham tell his story to Raleigh and the jury; the English court refused to recognize such a confrontation right.34 The First Congress had in mind this type of abuse when it included the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment.35 Crawford
establishes that the “principal evil” at which the Clause is
aimed is the “use of ex parte examinations as evidence against
the accused.”36
The Court expressly rejected the theory that the constitutional right to cross-examination might be coterminous with
hearsay rules:
An off-hand, overheard remark might be unreliable evidence and thus
a good candidate for exclusion under hearsay rules, but it bears little
resemblance to the civil-law abuses the Confrontation Clause targeted. On the other hand, ex parte examinations might sometimes be
admissible under modern hearsay rules, but the Framers certainly
would not have condoned them.37

Thus, Confrontation Clause analysis should not look to
hearsay law.38 In dicta, however, the Court suggested that two
hearsay exceptions are particularly noteworthy.39 First, because the “dying declarations” hearsay exception existed at
common law, it may have been incorporated into the Sixth
Amendment, even where testimonial dying declarations are at
issue.40 Second, the “business records” exception was part of the
common law by 1791 when the Sixth Amendment was passed,
but significantly, these records “by their nature were not testimonial.”41 The Court’s consideration of which exceptions were
allowed in criminal cases by 1791, and its general emphasis on
the historical backdrop to the Confrontation Clause, indicates
that courts should look to history.42
34. Id.
35. See id. at 49 (noting how the First Congress responded to an Antifederalist writing that “criticized the use of ‘written evidence’” without the “cross
examining [of ] witnesses”).
36. Id. at 50.
37. Id. at 51.
38. See id. at 61 (“Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not
think the framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”).
39. Id. at 56 & n.6.
40. Id. at 56 n.6. The Court noted that “[i]f this exception must be accepted on historical grounds, it is sui generis.” Id.
41. Id. at 56.
42. See id. at 43–50. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the seven-Justice majority
was a decidedly originalist opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and Justice O’Connor, while concurring in the overall judgment, dissented
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Although the Court did not spell out a complete definition
of “testimonial,” it set a minimum baseline that includes “prior
testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a
former trial; and . . . police interrogations.”43 Additionally, the
Court explained that statements made to police officers during
the course of interrogations are testimonial “under even a narrow standard” because they “bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in England,” making clear
that a statement is testimonial if it is the contemporary analogue of an abuse about which the First Congress was concerned.44 The last piece of definitional guidance the Court offered was three potential articulations of testimonial hearsay:
(1) “ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent”; (2)
“formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions”; and (3) “statements that
were made under circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial.”45 Because it was not necessary for the Court to adopt any of these various formulations, it
did not expressly do so—but notably, it also did not reject any
of them.46 Lending support to the third, broadest formulation,
the Court noted that “[i]nvolvement of government officers in
the production of testimony with an eye toward trial presents
unique potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out time
and again throughout a history with which the Framers were
keenly familiar.”47
In sum, the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of
testimonial hearsay in lieu of in-court confrontation either if
the declarant is available or if the defendant lacked a prior opportunity for cross-examination of an unavailable declarant.48
In deciding whether a statement is testimonial, a court should
not look to modern hearsay rules, but rather to the historical
context of the Sixth Amendment while considering what would
be the contemporary analogues to the Framers’ concerns.49 And
on prudential and stare decisis grounds from the Court’s decision to overrule
Roberts. See id. at 69 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
43. Id. at 68 (majority opinion).
44. See id. at 52.
45. Id. at 51–52.
46. See id. at 52 (“These formulations all share a common nucleus and
then define the clause’s coverage at various levels of abstraction around it.”).
47. Id. at 56 n.7.
48. Id. at 68.
49. Id. at 67–68 (discussing how it is unlikely that the framers would be
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anything which looks too much like prosecutorially elicited ex
parte testimony will raise Confrontation Clause concerns.50
C. THE DAVIS TIMING PRONG: ONGOING EMERGENCIES VS.
INVESTIGATION OF PAST CRIMES
Two years later, the Court in Davis again opted not to “attempt[] to produce an exhaustive classification” of testimoniality.51 It did, however, articulate an investigatory purpose test:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency,
and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.52

The Court was careful to note that the totality of the circumstances test it articulated was no broader than necessary to
resolve the cases before it.53 Statements not made in response
to police interrogation may also be testimonial.54 The Court also noted that “even when interrogation exists,” ultimately “the
declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions,” are
controlling for Confrontation Clause analysis.55
In determining whether statements made during a 911 call
and a house call by the police in response to domestic violence
were testimonial hearsay, the Court considered the following
satisfied relying on modern “reliability factors”).
50. Cf. id. at 50 (“[T]he principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause
was directed was the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its
use of ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused.”).
51. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
52. Id. at 822. The Court was apparently unconcerned with the subjective
intention of the police officer doing the investigating or interrogating. Justice
Thomas, in a separate opinion, articulated the reason behind the objective nature of the Court’s test as follows:
The Court’s repeated invocation of the word “objectiv[e]” to describe
its test . . . suggests that the Court may not mean to reference purpose at all, but instead to inquire into the function served by the interrogation. Certainly such a test would avoid the pitfalls that have
led us repeatedly to reject tests dependent on the subjective intentions of police officers.
Id. at 839 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgement and dissenting in part).
53. See id. at 822 n.1 (majority opinion) (explaining that the holding applies specifically to interrogations because the statements of the current case
were the “products of interrogations”).
54. Id. (“This is not to imply, however, that statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily nontestimonial.”).
55. Id.
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factors: contemporaneousness; the existence of an “ongoing
emergency”; “the nature of what was asked and answered”; and
formality or solemnity.56 In the case of a 911 call where the declarant identified her assailant while she faced an ongoing
emergency, the operator’s questions were objectively designed
to “elicit[] statements . . . necessary to be able to resolve the
present emergency,” and her answers were “frantic” and “provided over the phone” in a potentially dangerous situation, the
Court held that her statements were nontestimonial.57 Essentially, because “[n]o ‘witness’ goes into court to proclaim an
emergency and seek help,” her “emergency statement” was insufficiently similar to the type of ex parte testimony on which
Raleigh was convicted to create a Sixth Amendment problem.58
On different facts the Court reached the opposite conclusion.59 Where the police arrived at the declarant’s home, were
told by her “that things were fine,” she was not presently in
danger, and the officers questioned her in a separate room from
her husband for the purpose of obtaining better information
about the crime that had occurred, the Court determined that
the declarant’s statements were “an obvious substitute for live
testimony, because they do precisely what a witness does on direct examination,” thus rendering the statements testimonial.60
Such an inquiry is plainly fact-intensive. Further complicating
a Davis inquiry is the Court’s encouragement of the use of in
limine procedure to redact the testimonial portions of statements that began as nontestimonial statements made in response to an emergency.61
Davis does not contemplate scientific evidence. However,
the analytical factors employed by the Court can be useful to
lower courts attempting to determine whether such evidence is
testimonial.

56. Id. at 827.
57. Id. at 814, 827.
58. Id. at 828.
59. Two different state supreme court cases were consolidated in Davis v.
Washington and thus the Court was able to apply its interpretation of the Confrontation Clause to two entirely different sets of facts. Id. at 817–21.
60. Id. at 830.
61. Id. at 829.
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II. SCIENCE MEETS THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IN
THE LOWER COURTS
Cases involving scientific evidence commonly occur where
seized substances are tested for a composition analysis, where
blood samples of suspected intoxicated drivers are tested for alcohol and narcotics content, where DNA analysis is performed
in rape or homicide cases, and where medical examiners perform autopsies.62 In such cases, Roberts reliability analysis was
fairly easy to perform. But courts have struggled to apply the
new testimoniality analysis prescribed by Crawford and Davis.
This Part examines the cases that consider evidence such as
laboratory reports to be per se testimonial, the cases that essentially render ad hoc decisions, the post-Crawford cases that
are de facto Roberts analyses, and the machine-generatedstatements rationale currently being developed in at least three
of the circuits.
A. COURTS HOLDING THAT A LABORATORY REPORT IS ALWAYS
TESTIMONIAL
This Note now considers the various cases finding laboratory reports to be per se testimonial within the meaning of
Crawford and Davis. Typical of these cases is State v. Caulfield,63 in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a police laboratory report identifying a seized substance as cocaine
constituted testimonial hearsay where the analyst who prepared the report did not testify at trial.64 The court found that
the laboratory report fit under “each of the three generic descriptions offered by the Supreme Court in Crawford” of what
“testimonial” might mean.65 First, it “functioned as the equivalent of testimony” by identifying the cocaine as cocaine.66
Second, the report was an affidavit—a formalized testimonial
material specifically identified in Crawford.67 Third, it “was
clearly prepared for litigation.”68 The court considered the
last—preparation for use at trial—to be the “critical determina62. See, e.g., Prater v. State, 820 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Ark. 1991); State v.
Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 306–07 (Minn. 2006); State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626,
628–29 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
63. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 304.
64. Id. at 306–07.
65. Id. at 309.
66. Id.
67. Id.; Crawford v. Washinton, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004).
68. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 309.
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tive factor” in its analysis.69 Anticipating Davis, the Minnesota
Supreme Court relied heavily on the circumstances surrounding the generation of the “statement” identifying the seized
substance, concluding that the sole purpose of generating the
laboratory report was to have it available for use at trial.70 The
court’s determination was based on the facts that the police had
already arrested Caulfield and that they had preliminarily determined that the seized substance was cocaine.71
A New Jersey appellate court in State v. Kent72 reached a
similar conclusion to Caulfield applying both Crawford and
Davis.73 Adam J. Kent had crashed his car, and when a police
officer arrived at the scene at 1:40 a.m., he noted that Kent
smelled of alcohol.74 Kent acknowledged that he had been
drinking.75 The suspect was taken to a hospital, where the officer asked a nurse to draw a sample of his blood, which was
then taken to a police laboratory for toxicology and gas chromatography analysis.76 The laboratory report indicated that the
defendant’s blood alcohol content was above the legal limit.77
While acknowledging that, under the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, a police chemist’s laboratory report is a business record,
the Kent court nonetheless found that admission of the chemist’s report where the chemist did not testify at trial violated
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine him.78
Performing a Davis analysis, the court concluded that the defendant’s blood was not analyzed to deal with an ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the report was to prove
at trial the past event that the defendant’s blood alcohol concentration was high enough to expose him to criminal liability.79 The court also concluded that under Crawford the nurse’s
signed blood sample certification was the functional equivalent

69. See id. (“We have said the critical determinative factor assessing
whether a statement is testimonial is whether it was prepared for litigation.”).
70. See id. (“The . . . report was clearly prepared for litigation.”).
71. Id.
72. State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
73. Cf. id. at 639–40 (citing Caulfield with approval).
74. Id. at 628–29.
75. Id. at 629.
76. Id. at 629–31.
77. Id. at 631.
78. Id. at 636–40.
79. Id. at 637.
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of an affidavit because the nurse knew that falsifying its context would be unlawful, thereby rendering it testimonial.80
Courts in other jurisdictions have reached the same conclusion as the Minnesota and New Jersey courts did in Caulfield and Kent. The distilled analysis of these decisions consists
of two major, interrelated points. First, laboratory reports do
not fall within the business-records exception recognized in
1791, that is, the inherently nontestimonial sort of business
record contemplated by Justice Scalia’s dictum in Crawford.81
As the District of Columbia Court of Appeals explained: “Traditionally, the historical business-records exception did not encompass records prepared for use in litigation, let alone records
produced ex parte by government agents for later use in criminal prosecution.”82 The court explained that Crawford makes
clear that the accused’s confrontation right cannot have been
diminished by expansions of the business-records exception under modern evidence law.83
Second, courts emphasize that these reports are being generated for the primary (or sole) purpose of facilitating criminal
prosecution, and that as such they are testimonial statements
implicating the Confrontation Clause.84 The United States Army Court of Criminal Appeals provides a good example of this
reasoning in United States v. Williamson.85 The defendant’s
marijuana was seized, tested, and subsequently identified by a
senior forensic chemist as marijuana.86 The court concluded
that because “the ‘statement’ [was] a post-apprehension laboratory report, requested after local police arrested [the defendant],” the statement—that scientific examination indicated
that the seized substance was an illegal drug—was necessarily
testimonial.87 Courts have also reached this conclusion in the

80. See id. at 637–39.
81. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004); see also Thomas
v. United States, 914 A.2d 1, 13 (D.C. 2006) (“As an historical matter, the exception in 1791 was a very narrow one.”).
82. Thomas, 914 A.2d at 13.
83. Id. at 27.
84. See, e.g., id. at 14 (“[B]ecause DEA chemist’s reports are created expressly for use in criminal prosecutions as a substitute for live testimony
against the accused, such reports are testimonial, whether or not they happen
to meet this jurisdiction’s definition of a business record.”).
85. United States v. Williamson, 65 M.J. 706 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2007).
86. Id. at 707–10.
87. Id. at 717–18.
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context of laboratory reports identifying seized substances,88
tests of a rape victim’s blood alcohol content where her intoxication level affected her ability to consent,89 and tests of the
suspect’s blood in drunk driving cases such as Kent.90
B. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IS NONTESTIMONIAL—BUT ONLY
SOMETIMES
While many courts have conducted fairly fact-intensive inquiries, a rare occurrence in which the outcome truly seems dependent on the unique facts of the case is United States v. Magyari.91 In Magyari, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces held that a laboratory report identifying a positive test for methamphetamine during the course of regular,
randomized urinalysis screening was nontestimonial.92 The
court admitted the technician’s report under a business-records
hearsay exception.93 It emphasized that the urinalysis was
“routine” and randomized, and that the “vast majority” of such
tests are negative for illegal substances.94 In the Magyari
court’s view, the technicians simply “were not engaged in a law
enforcement function, a search for evidence in anticipation of
prosecution or trial. . . . Because the lab technicians were merely cataloging the results of routine tests, the technicians could
not reasonably expect their data entries would ‘bear testimony’
against Appellant at his court-martial.”95
88. See, e.g., Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 667 (Colo. 2007)
(en banc) (“There can be no serious dispute that the sole purpose of the report
was to analyze the substance found in Hinojos-Mendoza’s vehicle in anticipation of criminal prosecution.”); State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367, 376 (Kan. Ct.
App. 2007) (“The forensic scientist who prepared Laturner’s lab report was a
witness; the statements in her lab report were testimony; and she knew when
preparing her report that it would be used by the State at Laturner’s trial to
prove he committed the crime of possessing methamphetamine.”); State v.
March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 666 (Mo. 2007) (“A laboratory report, like this one,
that was prepared solely for prosecution to prove an element of the crime
charged is ‘testimonial’ because it bears all the characteristics of an ex parte
affidavit.”).
89. See People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)
(“Because the test was initiated by the prosecution and generated by the desire to discover evidence against defendant, the results were testimonial.”).
90. See State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 637–40 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2007).
91. United States v. Magyari, 63 M.J. 123 (C.A.A.F. 2006).
92. Id. at 124–25.
93. Id. at 127; see MIL. R. EVID. 803(6).
94. Magyari, 63 M.J. at 126.
95. Id. at 126–27.
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In concluding that the technicians could not have reasonably expected the results of their tests to be used for prosecution,
the court also stressed the importance of the following facts:
many people tested Magyari’s urine sample and recorded data
entries in his records; his sample was distinguishable only by
an anonymous number; and there was no reason to think that
anyone was pressured to reach a particular conclusion.96 However, the court expressly rejected the theory that laboratory reports are never testimonial.97 It was quick to point out that laboratory reports or similar records might be prepared “at the
behest of law enforcement in anticipation of prosecution,”
which would likely compel a finding of testimoniality.98 It concluded merely that the relevant Crawford considerations were
not in play under the unique facts with which it was presented.99 Importantly, the situation lacked both the potential
and the incentive for prosecutorial abuse.
C. NONTESTIMONIALITY AND THE TENDENCY TOWARD ROBERTS
ANALYSIS DRESSED IN CRAWFORD AND DAVIS CLOTHING
This Note now examines the line of cases holding that laboratory reports, and similar examples of scientific evidence,
are not testimonial. Five considerations run thematically
throughout these cases: the contemporaneous recordation of a
presently observable event; the fit of a business-records or similar hearsay exception; the objective facticity of the evidence; the
value of cross-examination for the defendant; and society’s
competing interests. Notably, such considerations are all derived from a misreading of Davis, a misunderstanding of Crawford, or a latent Roberts analysis.
1. Contemporaneous Recordation of Observations
An example of misplaced reliance on contemporaneousness
is the California Supreme Court’s opinion in People v. Geier.100
Geier involved a DNA report in a rape-homicide case.101 The
96. Id. at 127.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Cf. id. (“This conclusion is consistent with the Crawford Court’s policy
concerns that might arise where government officers are involved ‘in the production of testimony with an eye toward trial’ and where there is ‘unique potential for prosecutorial abuse’ and overreaching.” (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004))).
100. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104 (Cal. 2007).
101. Id. at 110, 131.
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court concluded that, based on Crawford and Davis, a DNA report would be testimonial only if it “describes a past fact related to criminal activity.”102 That is, under the court’s interpretation of Davis, “the crucial point is whether the statement
represents the contemporaneous recordation of observable
events.”103 That the DNA report was requested by the police
and the testing scientist could have anticipated its later use at
a criminal trial was more or less irrelevant, since the court
rendered these factors insufficient to implicate the Confrontation Clause.104
The Geier court’s application of its rule to the facts before it
was straightforward: the state’s DNA analyst recorded her observations at the time they occurred.105 The things she wrote in
her report therefore “constitute a contemporaneous recordation
of observable events rather than the documentation of past
events.”106 The court accordingly held that the DNA report was
nontestimonial.107
Other jurisdictions have undertaken similar inquiries. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire in State v. O’Maley108
agreed with Geier’s focus on “contemporaneous recordation,”
proclaiming it a “crucial point.”109 At issue in O’Maley was a laboratory report of a drunk driving suspect’s blood alcohol content where the workers who actually collected and tested
O’Maley’s blood did not testify at trial.110 The court held that
the blood sample collection form filled out by the blood-drawing
technician “constituted the technician’s contemporaneous recordation of observable events” and did not “describe any of the
defendant’s past conduct.”111 Rather than continuing this line
of thought, the court disposed of the question of the analyst’s
report on the theory that the report was never offered into evidence.112
This strain of analysis is fatally flawed. The argument that
a laboratory report used to prove a DNA match to prosecute a
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 138.
Id. at 140.
See id. at 139.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 140.
State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1 (N.H. 2007).
Id. at 11 (quoting Geier, 161 P.3d at 140).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 13.
See id. at 13–14.
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rape-homicide is not used to prove past events and is merely a
present-sense recording is conceptually specious.113 But apart
from the argument’s conceptual incoherence, it is constitutionally incorrect—it is based on a substantial misreading of Davis.
Davis was a fact-intensive inquiry made in the context of a police response to domestic violence.114 The Court focused on contemporaneousness to determine whether the circumstances
surrounding the statements made to the police objectively indicated that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to respond to an ongoing emergency or whether it was to gather
evidence pertaining to the past event (domestic violence) to be
proved at a subsequent criminal trial.115 In considering the contemporaneousness of the Davis declarant’s statements to the
911 operator, the court in Geier ignored the existence of the ongoing emergency in Davis which the declarant was contemporaneously describing to the police.116 Geier’s DNA analyst was
certainly not analyzing DNA, and at the same time recording
that analysis, in response to any ongoing emergency; and removed from the requirement of an ongoing emergency, all recording of testimonial hearsay statements would qualify as contemporaneous recording.
2. Crawford’s Business-Records Exception
The vast majority of cases finding scientific evidence nontestimonial misread the language in Crawford suggesting that
business records are inherently nontestimonial. The Second
Circuit, for example, held in United States v. Feliz117 that a
business record within the meaning of the Federal Rules of
Evidence is “fundamentally inconsistent” with the Supreme
Court’s idea of testimonial hearsay.118 The Second Circuit’s rationale was that since business records by definition are not
made in anticipation of litigation and do not include observations of police officers, they necessarily do not raise the sorts of
concerns the First Congress had in mind when it authored the

113. Cf. State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 637 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007)
(“Nor can it reasonably be argued that the ‘primary purpose’ of the lab certificate was anything other than to prove past events, specifically defendant’s
blood alcohol concentration, relevant to his DWI prosecution.”).
114. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
115. See id. at 827.
116. See People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 138 (Cal. 2007).
117. United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 233–34; see FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
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Sixth Amendment.119 In Feliz, the court dealt with the admissibility of autopsy reports of nine murder victims.120 It acknowledged that a reasonable medical examiner should anticipate that an autopsy report might be used at trial, but stated,
“this practical expectation alone cannot be dispositive on the
issue of whether those reports are testimonial.”121 It then held
on other grounds that autopsy reports are nontestimonial business records.122
Citing its own pre-Crawford precedent, the Massachusetts
high court in Commonwealth v. Verde123 asserted that a chemist’s report identifying a seized substance as cocaine was admissible as prima facie evidence without the chemist’s testimony under the public-records hearsay exception.124 The court
noted that the public-records exception was a “well-recognized”
one.125 The court’s analysis ultimately came down to its view
that the laboratory report was nontestimonial because it expressed objective scientific facts rather than conclusory opinions.126 An Illinois appellate court voiced a similar theory, explaining, “Crawford specifically disclaims any intention to
restrict traditional hearsay exceptions.”127
To the extent that courts rely on the theory that Crawford
permits the introduction of hearsay insofar as it falls within a
traditional hearsay exception, they seem to have confused current Confrontation Clause jurisprudence—Crawford—with the
old rule—Roberts—which is no longer good law.128 In other
119. Feliz, 467 F.3d at 234; see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
42–50 (2004) (discussing the original intent behind the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause).
120. Feliz, 467 F.3d at 229.
121. Id. at 235.
122. See id. at 236–37. Those “other grounds” are competing interests
which effectively constitute a Roberts balancing test. See Roberts v. Ohio, 448
U.S. 56, 65–66 (1980).
123. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701 (Mass. 2005). Verde was the
precursor to Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, the latest Confrontation Clause
case taken up by the Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz,
870 N.E.2d 676 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (unpublished table decision), cert.
granted, 128 S.Ct. 1647 (Mar. 17, 2008) (No. 07-591).
124. Verde, 827 N.E.2d at 704–05.
125. Id. at 705 n.3.
126. See id. at 705–06.
127. People v. So Young Kim, 859 N.E.2d 92, 94 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
128. In 2007, Justice Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, explained that
“Roberts had held that the Confrontation Clause permitted the admission of a
hearsay statement made by a declarant who was unavailable to testify if the
statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability . . . because the statement fell
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words, such opinions apply Roberts under the nominal guise of
applying Crawford.
The Second Circuit argued that the limitations on the
business-records exception function to weed out testimonial
evidence.129 Certainly if a record is not testimonial in nature,
the Confrontation Clause does not restrict its admission—the
Clause only applies to testimonial statements.130 But as the
New Hampshire Supreme Court explained, “[t]he Crawford dicta related to the business record exception that existed when
the Federal Constitution was drafted, not that which currently
exists.”131 The Second Circuit, after acknowledging a factor that
might render an autopsy report testimonial in spite of the
court’s interpretation of the hearsay exception—reasonable anticipation of prosecutorial use—then failed to explain why the
evidence was nonetheless nontestimonial.132
3. The Objective Facticity of Science
Some courts have concluded that objective facts in a scientific report are nontestimonial. The Supreme Court of Kansas,
for example, drew a distinction in State v. Lackey133 between
objective factual observations and opinions or disputed conclusions. The “factual, routine, descriptive, and nonanalytical findings” contained in an autopsy report are, according to the court,
not testimonial, whereas “conclusions drawn from the objective
findings” are testimonial.134 Lackey rejected a distinction between autopsy reports prepared for homicide investigations and
those where criminal litigation was not expected,135 instead
premising its rule on the theory that “routine and descriptive
observations” where the “examiner would have little incentive

within a firmly rooted hearsay exception . . . .” Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct.
1173, 1178 (2007). This approach is now defunct: “[t]he Crawford rule is flatly
inconsistent with the prior governing precedent, Roberts, which Crawford
overruled.” Id. at 1181.
129. See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 233–34 (2d Cir. 2006).
130. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 821 (2006).
131. State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 11 (N.H. 2007).
132. See Feliz, 467 F.3d at 234–36.
133. State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332 (Kan. 2005), overruled on other grounds
by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317, 321–23 (Kan. 2006). Davis overruled Lackey
with respect to hearsay evidence other than the autopsy report. See Davis, 158
P.3d at 321–23.
134. Lackey, 120 P.3d at 351.
135. Id. at 349.
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to fabricate the results” do not implicate the concerns expressed
in Crawford.136
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court also drew a
line around records of “primary fact.”137 It explained:
“[c]ertificates of chemical analysis are neither discretionary nor
based on opinion; rather, they merely state the results of a
well-recognized scientific test determining the composition and
quantity of the substance.”138 Based on similar theories, other
courts have concluded that to the extent that reports contain
“objective” data, they cannot be testimonial because they are
not accusatory.139
Such arguments are circular and depend on reliability considerations.140 Because “routine factual findings in an autopsy
report are generally reliable,” courts reason, “therefore, evidence of routine factual findings is not testimonial.”141 A Kansas appellate court explained the potential consequences of
adopting a “scientific facts are nontestimonial” rule on the facts
of the narcotics possession case before it:
A sine qua non for guilt is the possession of methamphetamine, proof
of which is only found in a report, the accuracy of which has not been
tested in the courtroom. To overcome the presumption of innocence
and convict Laturner of this charge, the jury had to be convinced
beyond a reasonable doubt that the lab report was correct. Thus,
136. See id. at 351.
137. Commonwealth v. Verde, 827 N.E.2d 701, 705 (Mass. 2005) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Slavski, 140 N.E. 465, 469 (Mass. 1923)).
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 140 (Cal. 2007) (“Records of
laboratory protocols followed and the resulting raw data acquired are not accusatory.”); State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 13 (N.H. 2007) (“The second factor
we believe is important is whether the statement is an accusation.”); see also
Michael H. Graham, Crawford/Davis “Testimonial” Interpreted, Removing the
Clutter, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 836–37 (2008) (arguing that forensic laboratory reports are nontestimonial because they “do not themselves accuse an
identified or identifiable person of having committed a crime”).
140. See, e.g., Hinojos-Mendoza v. People, 169 P.3d 662, 666 (Colo. 2007)
(en banc) (accusing courts of “erroneously focus[ing] on the reliability of [laboratory] reports”); State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 309 (Minn. 2006) (en
banc) (“The state refers us to cases from other states that, after Crawford,
hold that lab reports are not testimonial. But these cases seem to wrongly focus on the reliability of such reports.”); State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 665
(Mo. 2007) (“[G]enerally these cases seem to incorrectly focus on the reliability
of such reports.”); cf. Metzger, supra note 1, at 510 (“The misapprehension
about the testimonial nature of the crime laboratory reports seems to be this:
because the affidavits are ‘provided according to scientific procedures and
analysis,’ they are not testimonial.”).
141. State v. Laturner, 163 P.3d 367, 375 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (criticizing
this “circular” reasoning).
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proof of guilt becomes ipse dixit: it is so because the State says it is
so.142

Admission of otherwise testimonial statements merely because they consist of “neutral” facts—raw data rather than interpreted data—flies in the face of the Court’s reasoning in
Crawford.143 The “accusatory” angle, imagining that facts contained in a laboratory or autopsy report do not accuse the defendant of anything, also fails to withstand scrutiny—if a fact
is nonaccusatory, then in a typical DUI case, a defendant could
be convicted on the sole basis of two nonaccusatory, ex parte affidavits: (1) a police officer’s statement that she saw the defendant driving a car, then had the defendant’s blood drawn; and
(2) a laboratory technician’s statement that the defendant’s
blood contained a certain amount of an intoxicating substance.
Yet that would commit the “principal evil” that Crawford attempts to eradicate.144
4. Evidentiary Value to the Accused
In finding scientific evidence nontestimonial, courts tend to
point out that cross-examination would probably have been of
little value to the defendant in any event. In admitting a DNA
analysis report, the Supreme Court of California explained that
the analyst’s supervisor’s testimony “could reconstruct what the
analyst who processed the samples did at every step” because
laboratory regulations required the analyst to follow a set protocol.145 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire noted that if
the technician had testified at trial, she merely would have said
that her report was accurate.146 And in any event, “she ‘would
almost certainly not remember’” at trial how that exact test
had been performed.147 The Second Circuit posited that the fact
that “‘medical examiners who regularly perform hundreds of
autopsies are unlikely to have any independent recollection of
the autopsy at issue’”148 constitutes a “practical difficult[y]”
142. Id. at 376.
143. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66 (2004) (“The Framers
would be astounded to learn that ex parte testimony could be admitted against
a criminal defendant because it was elicited by ‘neutral’ government officers.”).
144. See id. at 50.
145. People v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 132 (Cal. 2007). The court also noted
that “DNA extraction is not a difficult procedure.” Id.
146. See State v. O’Maley, 932 A.2d 1, 13 (N.H. 2007).
147. Id. at 14 (quoting State v. Coombs, 821 A.2d 1030, 1033 (N.H. 2003)).
148. United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005)).
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avoided by its conclusion.149 But what is the practical difficulty?
Putting the analyst on the stand to say “I don’t remember this
particular examination, but I always follow protocol and I stand
behind what I put in my report” allows the jury to make an informed decision, and provides the defendant a fair opportunity
to inquire about bias and sloppy work habits.
Notably, the Second Circuit’s admonition about the likely
low value of cross-examination came in the context of its discussion of the dangers, from a policy perspective, of holding
that an autopsy report is a testimonial statement.150 In other
words, value-to-the-defendant analysis is a factor in a judicial
balancing test, which the Supreme Court overruled in Crawford.151 Even if not used as part of a Roberts-type balancing
test, judicial inquiry into the usefulness of potential crossexamination is inapposite.152 Cross-examination is a “strategic
decision” that the defendant may choose to exercise where she
believes it will be useful or valuable153—such as where there is
reason to suspect there were problems with the testing.154
5. The Competing Interests of Society
Courts worry that applying broadly the right to crossexamination will hamper the efficient and effective administration of justice. The Supreme Court of Kansas expressed its fear
that requiring the in-court testimony of a medical examiner
who performed the autopsy relevant to a murder prosecution
would waste public resources and, as in the case before it, preclude prosecutorially valuable evidence—or even prosecution itself—where the medical examiner had died or otherwise become unavailable.155 The court considered this to be a “harsh
and unnecessary result,” since autopsy reports are generally re-

149. Id.
150. See id.
151. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004).
152. Cf. United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2007)
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“A defendant’s right to confront witnesses against
him does not depend on whether a court believes that cross-examination would
be useful.”).
153. Id.
154. Cf. Metzger, supra note 1, at 499 (describing a case in which a state
crime laboratory worker “engage[d] in long-term, systematic, and deliberate
falsification of evidence in criminal cases”).
155. State v. Lackey, 120 P.3d 332, 351 (Kan. 2005), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Davis, 158 P.3d 317, 322 (Kan. 2006).
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liable and probably not fabricated.156 Other courts have voiced
similar concerns.157
Practical consequences to the public, however, are no longer a legitimate judicial consideration in deciding Confrontation
Clause cases.158 The Court’s emphatic, uncompromising language in Crawford makes clear that the Clause conveys upon
the defendant an absolute right and that the determination of
whether a statement is testimonial cannot be driven by policy
considerations.159
D. MACHINE WITNESSES: A DEVELOPING TWIST
A new Confrontation Clause rule is developing in some of
the U.S. Courts of Appeals. Already the Fourth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits have held lab reports to be nontestimonial
statements of machines or computers. This section examines
this theory, ultimately rejecting it as inconsistent with Supreme Court Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
In August 2007 a divided panel for the Fourth Circuit issued an opinion deciding United States v. Washington,160 a routine drunk driving case, on both typical and unique grounds.
The court issued three alternative holdings to dispense of the
defendant’s Confrontation Clause claim: (1) the “raw data” that
the expert witness relied upon or introduced were not statements of the laboratory technicians; (2) the data were not hearsay; and (3) the data were nontestimonial.161 All three holdings
rely on the court’s conclusion that the reports were solely computer-generated statements, which is an analytical angle from
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 236 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that an “‘autopsy cannot be replicated by another pathologist’” and indicating that it would be “‘against society’s interests to permit the unavailability of
the medical examiner . . . to preclude the prosecution of a homicide case’”
(quoting People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 869 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005))); People
v. Geier, 161 P.3d 104, 136–37 (Cal. 2007) (quoting with approval the factors
that the Kansas Supreme Court assigned to society’s competing interests in
the balancing test performed in Lackey).
158. Compare Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (articulating a balancing test that would allow for competing interests such as “effective law enforcement” to outweigh the defendant’s right to confront witnesses at trial),
with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–68 (2004) (overruling Roberts
and rejecting the use of a balancing test in place of the “constitutional guarantee[ ]” of the Confrontation Clause).
159. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 passim.
160. United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007).
161. Id. at 227–32.
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which no other court had approached a Crawford issue pertaining to forensic science.
The relevant facts follow: Dwonne A. Washington was convicted of driving under the influence after testing positive for
both phencyclidine (PCP) and alcohol above the legal limit.162
The forensic laboratory’s machines produced data indicating
the amount of these substances in Washington’s blood.163 The
laboratory’s manager, who did not operate the machines, testified at trial as an expert witness to the test results and the implications for Washington’s driving.164 In Washington’s view, he
was entitled to confront the lab technicians who actually saw
his blood and placed it in the testing machines.165 The magistrate judge overruled Washington’s objections and admitted
the lab manager’s testimony.166
The Fourth Circuit reasoned first that the data generated
by the laboratory’s machines were based on the machines’, rather than the technicians’, viewing and analysis of Washington’s blood sample.167 “The raw data generated by the diagnostic machines are the ‘statements’ of the machines themselves,
not their operators.”168 Second, because Rule 801 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as a “statement,” which “is
(1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a
person,”169 the court reasoned that there was no hearsay—
computers are not persons.170 Third, “the reports generated by
the machines were not testimonial in that they were not relating past events but the current condition of the blood in the
machines.”171 Since the machine had no way of knowing that
the blood sample it was analyzing was going to be used for evidence at trial, the evidence could not be considered testimonial
under the Davis purpose test.172 The court also noted that the
possibility of cross-examining the technicians was of “no value”
to the defendant, since the statements indicating that the blood

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 227–28.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 228–29.
Id. at 229.
Id.
Id. at 230.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 801(a), (c) (emphasis added).
Washington, 498 F.3d at 231.
Id. at 232.
Id.
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tested positive for alcohol and PCP were statements of the machines, not of the technicians.173
In January 2008 Chief Judge Easterbrook, writing for a
unanimous panel of the Seventh Circuit in United States v.
Moon, cited with approval the Fourth Circuit’s Washington decision.174 In the Seventh Circuit, “raw data produced by scientific instruments” are now nontestimonial, “though the interpretation of those data may be testimonial.”175 The underlying
reasoning is much the same: “If the readings are ‘statements’
by a ‘witness against’ the defendants, then the machine must
be the declarant. Yet how could one cross-examine a gas chromatograph? Producing spectrographs, ovens, and centrifuges in
court would serve no one’s interests.”176
The logic of Moon is self-defeating. The Seventh Circuit
conceded that “[a] chemist’s assertion that ‘this substance was
cocaine’” is testimonial within the meaning of Davis.177 In
drawing its data-interpretation distinction, the court explained
by way of analogy that if a physician tests a patient’s blood, the
conclusion that the patient has diabetes would be testimonial,
but her insulin and blood sugar levels would be nontestimonial
“raw results.”178 But in this example, the amount of insulin in
the patient’s blood would be analogous to the amount of cocaine
in the defendant’s blood; the conclusion that the patient has diabetes is closer to the conclusion that the defendant violated
the law. The underlying chemical composition of cocaine, which
the Seventh Circuit considers to be nontestimonial, is inseparable from the fact that the underlying chemical composition of
cocaine is in fact simultaneously cocaine itself, which the Seventh Circuit considers to be testimonial.
In part, the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Washington is
merely another example of the Roberts-type analysis. That Rule
801 defines hearsay as a statement of a person (and not of a
machine)179 is be irrelevant for constitutional purposes—
because “hearsay” for Confrontation Clause purposes is not
necessarily identical to “hearsay” as defined by subject-to-

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 230.
United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
FED. R. EVID. 801(a), (c).
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change evidence rules.180 Instead, the relevant question should
be whether the statement is offered to prove the truth of the
matter asserted.181 The Fourth Circuit’s theory that the tests
were a mere contemporaneous recordation of the state of the
suspect’s blood is based on the misreading of Davis explained
above.182 And the court’s reliance on the idea that the defendant would not have gleaned anything of value from an opportunity for cross-examination is completely out of line with current Confrontation Clause doctrine.183
The Fourth Circuit’s twist on the problem—categorizing
the laboratory reports as statements of the machines only—
functions as an attempt to cheat Crawford and Davis.184 Most
importantly, this classification is conceptually bizarre. As the
dissent explained, “[t]he test results, although computergenerated, were produced with the assistance and input of the
technicians and must therefore be attributed to the technicians.”185 Traditionally, only if “the assertion is produced without any human assistance or input” have federal courts considered computer-generated assertions not to be statements of
persons.186 Here, the technician played a “significant role” in
running the tests and creating and documenting the results.187
One implication of the Washington majority’s classification
is that the defendant has no right to confront the laboratory
technician—there is no statement of the technician to crossexamine.188 Because the court found that the report was not
testimonial hearsay, it did not address the question of how the
accused might enforce his right to confront a machine. Technol180. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
181. Cf. id. at 59 n.9.
182. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827–28 (2006) (discussing contemporaneousness as only one of many factors to be considered in determining
whether evidence is testimonial).
183. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67–69 (rejecting the Roberts balancing test
in favor of a bright line approach to Confrontation Clause analysis).
184. This approach has also gained traction in the Eleventh Circuit. See
United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008) (“In light of the
constitutional text and the historical focus of the Confrontation Clause, we are
persuaded that the witnesses with whom the Confrontation Clause is concerned are human witnesses, and that the evidence challenged in this appeal
does not contain the statements of human witnesses.” (citing United States v.
Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Washington, 498
F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007))).
185. Washington, 498 F.3d at 231–32 (Michael, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 233 (emphasis added).
187. Id.
188. See id. at 230 (majority opinion).
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ogy is not yet at the point where a computer is capable of taking the stand and answering questions in response to counsel’s
cross-examination. Yet while Crawford and Davis would accordingly render the machine’s statement inadmissible, the
Fourth Circuit explained that “reliability concerns” could be
addressed “through authentication” of the underlying technological processes, thereby suggesting that machine-generated testimonial hearsay statements are admissible even though the
witness is not subject to cross-examination.189
Ultimately, machine-generated laboratory reports are produced jointly by machines and the persons operating the machines. The reports must be considered statements of those
persons. Although the analysis in this section indicates that the
laboratory reports at issue in Washington and Moon should
have been held to be testimonial, more important is the understanding that such reports must be deemed either testimonial
or nontestimonial on the same grounds as any other laboratory
report. The machine-generated-statement theory is not persuasive.
III. AN ANALYSIS FOR COURTS TO FOLLOW
In light of the split among lower courts, this Note proposes
that courts should, in order to apply Crawford and Davis faithfully, start analyzing Confrontation Clause cases pertaining to
scientific evidence in a consistent manner, set forth below. Two
generalized groups of cases need to be treated differently. For
dealing with laboratory reports, in most instances a bright-line
rule declaring the reports testimonial statements of the persons
who generated them will be appropriate. Autopsy reports
should be considered on a case-by-case basis, while adhering to
the principles outlined below.
A. LABORATORY REPORTS: A (NEARLY) BRIGHT-LINE RULE
Most laboratory reports used by prosecutors against the
accused are prepared for criminal prosecution. Frequently occurring examples include blood tests of persons suspected of
driving while intoxicated and chemical analyses of seized substances suspected of being illegal narcotics. In such cases,
courts should hold that the reports are per se testimonial.
However, there will be rare cases in which such a ruling is in189. See id. at 231. The court’s consideration of reliability is, of course,
misplaced. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 67–69 (2004).
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appropriate—this “Magyari exception” should be approached in
an ad hoc manner.
1. Many Laboratory Reports Are Testimonial Per Se
Caulfield is, in all relevant factual aspects, typical of drug
seizure cases. Police observed Scott Caulfield behaving suspiciously in and outside of a bar in Rochester, Minnesota.190 In
short, he was behaving like a drug dealer.191 The police lawfully192 took six plastic bags from Caulfield, which contained what
the suspect identified as cocaine.193 The police recorded a positive field test and sent the drugs to a crime laboratory, where
an analyst produced a report identifying the substance as cocaine.194 The prosecution introduced the analyst’s report without putting the analyst on the stand.195
For Confrontation Clause purposes, the facts of Kent are
analogous to those of Caulfield. Late at night, Adam J. Kent
crashed his car; he hit the curb and his car wound up upsidedown on somebody’s front yard.196 A police officer arrived and
noticed that Kent smelled like alcohol.197 Kent’s speech was
slurred and, when questioned, he admitted that he had consumed five beers that evening.198 The officer concluded that
Kent was intoxicated and arrested him, taking him to the hospital because of the crash.199 At the request of the police, a hospital worker drew a sample of Kent’s blood and signed a certificate indicating that he had followed protocol.200 The police sent
the blood sample to their forensic laboratory, which issued a
report concluding that Kent’s blood alcohol content was above
the legal limit.201
State v. Crager202 was a murder case in which the DNA
analysis conducted also fits the pattern of Caulfield and
190. State v. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Minn. 2006) (en banc).
191. Id.
192. Had the police behaved unlawfully, that would be a Fourth Amendment question outside of the scope of this Note.
193. Caulfield, 722 N.W.2d at 307.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 306.
196. State v. Kent, 918 A.2d 626, 628 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2007).
197. Id. at 629.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 629–30.
201. Id. at 630–31.
202. State v. Crager, 116 Ohio St.3d 369, 2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745.
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Kent.203 The police found a woman lying murdered in the bedroom of her home.204 They identified Lee Crager as a suspect,
and upon finding his clothes covered in blood, submitted it for
DNA testing; it was a match for the victim’s DNA.205 Crager’s
DNA also matched that found on cigarettes at the crime
scene.206 The prosecution offered the DNA report into evidence
without having the DNA analyst who performed the tests testify at trial.207
In each case—Caulfield, Kent, and Crager—the police suspected the defendant of having committed a crime, and in order
to prove that crime, had scientific tests run at a laboratory. In
each case, a court can determine under a straightforward Davis
analysis that the laboratory report is a testimonial statement of
the person who authored it. It is difficult, perhaps impossible,
to imagine any circumstances under which these tests would
have been run in which law enforcement was not attempting to
establish the facts relevant to the potential prosecution of a
crime. It is similarly difficult or impossible to imagine any circumstances under which ordering a laboratory analysis of a
seized substance believed to be illegal narcotics, a blood screening of a suspected drunk driver, or a DNA or other analysis
matching a suspected criminal to evidence found at a crime
scene, could possibly be for the purpose of enabling the police to
meet an ongoing emergency.
In short, where the police request a laboratory analysis of
what seems to be evidence, that analysis will always be testimonial. In order to promote adherence to the Supreme Court’s
presentation of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford and Davis, courts should therefore articulate a bright-line rule announcing that such evidence is per se testimonial.

203. Courts in Kent and Caulfield and the appellate court in State v. Crager, 164 Ohio App. 3d 816, 2005-Ohio-6868, 844 N.E.2d 390, found that laboratory reports are testimonial under Crawford. The Supreme Court of Ohio,
however, reversed the appellate court’s decision in Crager, finding that under
Crawford, the reports were “non-testimonial.” See 116 Ohio St.3d 369, 2007Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745, at ¶ 78.
204. 116 Ohio St.3d 369, 2007-Ohio-6840, 879 N.E.2d 745, at ¶ 2.
205. Id. ¶ 2–4.
206. Id. ¶ 4.
207. Id. ¶ 8 (the DNA analyst who prepared the two DNA reports was on
maternity leave at the time of trial).
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2. The Magyari Exception
In Magyari, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces encountered the issue of an employer’s regularly conducted, randomized urine testing which had the potential to trigger criminal prosecution.208 The laboratory technicians had no way of
knowing whose sample they were working with; it was identical
to the other 199 samples in the batch.209 A civilian analogue to
the facts of Magyari may not even presently exist.210
The facts of this case are extremely important, and a totality of the circumstances test was appropriately applied. The
technicians knew or should have known that a positive test
could trigger prosecution. The tests were serving a law enforcement function.211 But no person whose sample was tested
should be considered a suspect, and in the case of each sample,
it was far more likely than not that no crime had been committed.212 When sufficiently similar cases arise, courts ought to
look at the facts of each case, apply the rules articulated in
Crawford and Davis where possible, and consider the aims of
the Confrontation Clause and the spirit in which the two cases
were decided. Courts should keep in mind that the Sixth
Amendment expresses a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial. In asking whether the circumstances surrounding
the request for the scientific analysis indicate that the purpose
is to prove facts potentially relevant to a subsequent prosecution, the particularity of the request is relevant—the existence
of a suspect or criminal investigation makes it more likely that
the scientific analysis will be testimonial. And civilian law enforcement should be given less leeway than the military because the military deals only with the members of its own or-

208. See United States v. Magyari, 63 M.J. 123, 127 (C.A.A.F. 2006) (applying the Confrontation Clause analysis framework of Crawford and Roberts,
civilian criminal proceedings, to court-martial proceedings).
209. Id. at 126.
210. The closest analogous situation might be employer drug testing. A
nonmilitary employer’s sanctions for a failed drug test, however, do not include criminal or equivalent proceedings. Absent an employer working in cooperation with law enforcement, there is not even the potential for criminal
proceedings—an obvious requirement for application of the Confrontation
Clause.
211. But see Magyari, 63 M.J. at 126 (“In this context, the better view is
that these lab technicians were not engaged in a law enforcement function, a
search for evidence in anticipation of prosecution or trial.”).
212. See id.
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ganization, in what the Supreme Court has long recognized as
“the unique nature of . . . the military society.”213
B. AUTOPSY REPORTS
An autopsy report is not “prepared for use at trial,” but
“any medical examiner preparing such a report must expect
that it may later be available for use at trial.”214 An autopsy report records the medical examiner’s observations and announces a cause of death.215 Rather than being prepared at the
request of law enforcement officers, it is frequently ordered by
statute and performed by a nonadversarial medical examiner.216 However, the fact that the medical examiner is not supposed to be in an adversarial relationship with the suspect is
not a valid constitutional consideration.217
Courts will have to weigh the relevant constitutional considerations under the surrounding circumstances of each case.
To what extent does using an autopsy report as evidence
against a criminal defendant resemble the use of ex parte evidence against the accused? How much potential is there for
prosecutorial abuse, especially in highly political cases? To
what extent should the medical examiner anticipate that the
autopsy will prove past events relevant to use at a criminal trial?
On a general level, one commentator has suggested that
“the Confrontation Clause should allow a defendant to confront
the crucial piece of hearsay that directly establishes an element
of the crime.”218 More particularly, it is clear that an autopsy
report is at least functionally equivalent to one type of formalized statement—an affidavit—about which the Court expressed concern.219 Whether the police have identified a suspect
213. See United States v. Rankin, 63 M.J. 552, 555 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
2006) (citing Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986)).
214. See United States v. Feliz, 467 F.3d 227, 235 (2d Cir. 2006).
215. See id. at 236 n.6; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 145 (8th ed. 2004).
216. Bradley Morin, Note, Science, Crawford, and Testimonial Hearsay:
Applying the Confrontation Clause to Laboratory Reports, 85 B.U. L. REV.
1243, 1264 (2005).
217. Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 66 (2004) (explaining this in
the context of “neutral” government officers). Contra Carolyn Zabrycki, Comment, Toward a Definition of “Testimonial”: How Autopsy Reports Do Not Embody the Qualities of a Testimonial Statement, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1093, 1111
(2008) (arguing that autopsy reports should be deemed nontestimonial because medical examiners are nonadversarial and are not government officers).
218. Morin, supra note 216, at 1264.
219. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (setting forth the three potential de-

1088

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1058

should be a significant factor in a court’s decision. If there is a
suspect, there is an ongoing criminal investigation and a medical examiner has a reason to reach a certain result. At the moment it becomes clear that foul play was likely involved in the
subject’s death, whether because there is an ongoing criminal
investigation or because the body itself so indicates, an objective observer would think that the report is reasonably likely to
be used at trial.220 While these factors indicate that there is a
good chance an autopsy report used by the prosecution in a
criminal trial will be testimonial, there are imaginable circumstances in which it will be nontestimonial—such as where there
are no identified suspects and there is low potential for
abuse.221
CONCLUSION
Due to a sharp split among the lower courts in the wake of
Crawford and Davis, criminal defendants in a significant number of jurisdictions are being denied their constitutional right to
confront the witnesses against them. In cases involving forensic
science, many courts are applying federal constitutional law
correctly. Many others, however, are still analyzing the evidence under a now-defunct Roberts test and reaching the wrong
result, thereby preventing a large number of defendants from
cross-examining the forensic scientists who function as powerful witnesses against them. Courts should announce that where
the police request a forensic laboratory analysis of what seems
to be evidence, that analysis is a per se testimonial statement
of the person who played a significant role in conducting the
scientific testing. Courts should undertake fact-intensive casefinitions of “testimonial,” one of which deals with formalized statements such
as affidavits).
220. The “what an objective person would reasonably think” standard has
been used frequently in constitutional law, particularly in constitutional criminal procedure. See Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral
and Direct Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of
“Sexually Violent Predators,” 93 MINN. L. REV. 670, 713–19 (2008). With respect to the Confrontation Clause, the text of the Court’s jurisprudence creates
the foundation for such a test. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51–52 (discussing the
“objective witness” formulation of a “testimonial” statement).
221. Somewhat paradoxically, there might be as much potential for prosecutorial abuse where the circumstances indicate that foul play might—but
might not—have been involved, because in this situation the medical examiner’s statement has the ability to propel or stall prosecution of any eventual
suspect. This further supports the idea that autopsy reports will require factintensive analysis under the Confrontation Clause.
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by-case analyses where autopsy reports are at issue, applying a
totality of the circumstances test in which the identification of
a suspect in a criminal investigation is an especially weighty
factor.

